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Abstract 
This article attempts to summarise the growing literature on “financialisation” 
in developing and emerging countries. This will include the different 
theoretical and empirical works that have explicitly referred to the increasing 
role of finance in such countries as “financialisation”, as well as the recent 
developments in non-conventional approaches to finance and development. 
The article will cover the main theoretical approaches that have been used to 
explain the phenomenon, trying to set out what are the specific characteristics 
of the role of finance in such countries. It will then present an overview of the 
key empirical facts coming out of such literatures that are associated with 
“financialisation”, with respect to both the changing role of the domestic 
financial sector and the impact of external factors, with particular reference to 
capital account openness. 
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	Introduction	
The conventional theoretical and policy debates on the relationship between 
finance and development have focused heavily on the conjecture and 
assessment of a positive causal relation between the former and the latter1. 
Such an analysis, while bringing finance to the fore, does not however move 
much beyond a standard neoclassical analysis: financial markets are 
assessed in terms of their importance and efficiency in supplying their service 
to the economy, i.e. how much and how well they channel saving to 
investment. 
Alternative schools of thought present a more complex view of the relation 
between finance and the “real economy”. Some of the most prominent 
“heterodox” traditions, such as Post-Keynesian, Institutional, Marxian and 
Regulationist schools of economics and political economy, have paid attention 
to the rise of finance in the economy, by pointing out its historical evolution 
and its consequences. Many have referred to this rise as “financialisation”, 
which has been over the past few years the subject of a rapidly developing 
literature. Most of the literature has assessed the impact of an evolving 
financial sector on advanced economies. However, some contributions focus 
on the peculiar features of financialisation in developing and emerging 
economies.  
The literature on financialisation on developing countries is relatively new, 
                                            
1 Paradigmatic of such approach is the concept of “financial development” 
(see, for instance, King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997). 
and to the best knowledge of the author, a systematic review of it does not yet 
exist. This is the purpose of the article. The first section will analyse the 
conceptual issues about financialisation in developing countries, particularly 
its role in the evolution of the political economy of such countries. The second 
section will provide an overview of the key empirical facts that have been 
associated with financialisation in developing countries. The third section will 
deal with the international aspects of financialisation, such as capital flows 
cycles and financial integration. The fourth section concludes by providing a 
systematic overview of the considered themes.  
 
1. Financialisation	in	the	Political	Economy	of	
Developing	Countries	
 
Financialisation is almost everywhere defined in the words of Epstein, (2005, 
p. 1) as:  
“the increasing importance of financial markets, financial motives, financial 
institutions, and financial elites in the operation of the economy and its 
governing institutions, both at the national and international levels”.  
This very broad definition has allowed many different theoretical approaches 
to address the issue. In the context of developing countries, the different 
theoretical frameworks more or less fit within the schools of thought of the 
Theory of the Regulation, Marxist political economy or post-Keynesian 
economics. Of course the boundaries are sometimes blurred since, for 
example, the regulationist school has much in common with both Marxist and 
post-Keynesian concepts. However, the approaches often emphasise 
different aspects and conceptualisation of the process of financialisation. 
The school of thought that has first addressed the specificity of developing 
countries in their path towards financialization is the regulationist school. More 
or less explicitly, authors seek to explain different aspects of a “financialised 
regime of accumulation”. Much like the move from “Fordist” to finance-led 
patterns of accumulation that occurred in many advanced economies (e.g. 
Boyer, 2000), many developing countries have experience a shift from 
different forms of “peripheral Fordism” to locally-specific forms of 
financialisation of their economy (Becker et al., 2010).  
A key element of regulationist theories is that a regime of accumulation 
needs a “mode of regulation”, a set of institutions and policies, to make the 
economic and social reproduction feasible. Therefore the policy shifts that 
occurred in developing countries in parallel to their increasing financialisation 
are a central focus of the analysis. Since the late 1970s, many developing 
countries have followed the policy advices of proponents of financial 
liberalisation and financial development. Moreover these policies fit into the 
broader context of the transition in economic policy towards more market-
friendly development strategies and a shift in macroeconomic policies, 
propagated by the World Bank and the IMF during the Washington 
Consensus era. These changes have deeply affected the role of the financial 
sector in the economy and the political economy of these countries.  
Financialisation is therefore not a linear process and assumes different 
forms in developing countries vis-à-vis advanced economies, as well as 
country-specific forms. A first big distinction, which is made by Becker et al., 
(2010, p. 228), is “financialization between the take-off of a second circuit of 
… securities, and financialization based on interest-bearing capital and, thus, 
on high interest rates”. The first type of financialisation, which has its core in 
the inflation of financial assets price, is the most common form in advanced 
Anglo-Saxon countries. However financialization through interest income may 
be of particular relevance for many developing countries, since inflation and 
the need to encourage capital inflows (or discourage capital flights) has often 
induced these countries to adopt high-interest rates policies.  
Post-Keynesian approaches points to the rise of financial profits and 
incomes as one of the key processes of financialisation (Stockhammer, 2004). 
In the context of emerging markets, Demir (2007) points to the rise of “rentier” 
capitalism, primarily through the financialisation of firms’ income, and its 
negative consequences for productive investment and growth. There is, 
however, a distinctive lack of explicitly post-Keynesian theoretical literature on 
the issue of financialisation in developing countries. 
Marxist accounts of financialisation emphasise similar aspects. Ashman et 
al. (2011) situate the process of financialisation in Marx’s distinction between 
interest-bearing versus other forms of capital, and between the accumulation 
of real versus fictitious capital.  
“The neoliberal period has witnessed both the subordination of real 
accumulation to fictitious capital – with the expansion of speculative assets at 
the expense of real investment – and the integration of real accumulation into 
the realm of interest-bearing capital, resulting in financialised accumulation of 
a systemic nature.” (Ashman et al. 2011: 176) 
Ideological and policy shifts that empower private capital, such as 
privatisation and the deterioration of public provision of services and goods, 
have further strengthened the power of finance over the economy and the 
social and political structure of developing countries. Neoliberalism is 
therefore tightly linked to financialisation (Fine, 2010), although perhaps by 
coincidence of interests rather than necessarily by explicit design. 
Also includible within the tradition of Marxist political economy is Jeff 
Powell’s concept of “subordinate financialisation” (Powell, 2013), which refers 
to the Marxist concepts of imperialism. The distinctiveness of financialisation 
in peripheral countries is its subordinate nature, i.e. the extent to which it is 
“shaped by imperial relations between states” (Powell, 2013: 3). Thus 
peripheral countries are subject to similar shifts experienced by core 
countries, but at the same times these are mediated by their subordinate 
position, which shapes the form in which financialisation takes place. For 
example, the global shift to market-based finance by firms, in peripheral 
countries presents the additional feature of firms turning “disproportionately to 
foreign capital, allowing the extraction of a share of the domestically-
generated surplus” (Powell, 2013: 19)  
Marxist approaches, however, differ markedly from both Post-Keyensian and 
regulationist approaches in their emphasis on power and class relations. As 
Marois (2011) argues, there is a need to move beyond institutions and policy 
and uncover the underlying structural political dimensions. This leads Marxist 
scholars to refute the concept of a “rentier class”. As Ashman et al. (2011) 
argue, the shift of the balance of power from labour to capital and from real to 
interest-bearing capitalists is different from arguing that financialisation simply 
marks the return of the rentier. 
These disagreements are reflected by the different emphases that these 
approaches put in the historical accounts of the rise of financialisation. For 
those who work within a regulationist framework, it is central to evaluate the 
evolution of the “monetary and financial regime”, in relation to the rise of 
finance-led accumulation regimes. The case of Brazil is paradigmatic in this 
sense. While the country implemented Washington Consensus policies more 
slowly and partially than other Latin American countries, already in the 1980s 
the country’s monetary and financial regime were conducive of a peculiar kind 
of financialization based on a dual-currency system. Alongside the state-
issued currency that was continuously eroded by inflation, an alternative 
currency, endogenously issued by the financial sector backed by public debt 
and indexed to inflation, allowed the accumulation of wealth by private 
financial institutions (Araújo et al., 2012; Paulani, 2010). When policies of 
privatisation and liberalisation as well as commitments to monetary and price 
stability came about in the early 1990s, financial accumulation was primarily 
driven by very high interest rates2. The expansion of internally held public 
debt, also due to state intervention to counteract the 1999 financial crisis, 
marks the internal financialisation of the country, with a redistribution of 
income from the middle-class towards financial capital (Becker et al., 2010). 
                                            
2 Araújo et al. (2012) calculate that holding government bills at the Selic rate 
from January 1991 to January 1999 increased the capital sevenfold.  
Similar experiences, where the shifts in the mode of regulation promoted 
financialisation, have been shared by other countries. The experience of 
Mexico has been one of recurrent financial crises followed by state 
intervention in favour of the financial sector, coupled with high-interest rates 
and economic policies that slowly moved the economy towards a finance-led 
regime (Correa et al., 2012). Indeed, contrary to Brazil, Mexico followed more 
closely the policy suggestions of the Washington Consensus in the field of 
financial liberalisation. The banking sector, for instance, was extensively 
privatised and opened to foreign competition, whereas in Brazil state-owned 
banks and, in particular, the development bank BNDES, continue to play an 
important role within the domestic financial sector.  
The importance of post-crisis IMF-led reforms towards financial liberalisation 
has been typical of East-Asian countries as well.  In South Korea, a vast 
program of banking and financial liberalisation was undertaken in the 
aftermath of the East Asian financial crisis (Crotty and Lee, 2002; Kalinowski 
and Cho, 2009). In Malaysia, the move towards financialisation has also been 
propelled by policies after the 1998 crisis, but these were of a more “selective” 
scope: as Rethel (2010) argues, “the state remained the gatekeeper of 
Malaysian capitalism”, in actively promoting some financial practices that 
drove the economy to a more finance-led accumulation regime. The role of 
the State within the country’s political economy during the financialisation 
process thus remains a key variable of analysis.  
Marxist scholars emphasise the more structural global and national 
economic factors. The rise of financialisation is both the result of national 
shifts of class power towards capital in general and financial capital in 
particular. Therefore Marxists scholars have sought to assess what processes 
may lead to such political shifts. In developing countries, as Ashman et al. 
(2011: 189) “there is the added twist of both creating financial elites and 
strengthening their roles.” Such creation may intertwine with other political 
objectives, such as the creation of a black political elite in South Africa 
(Ashman et al., 2011) or a local-Malay entrepreneurial class in Malaysia 
(Rethel, 2010).  
Another factor affecting the balance of political power towards finance has 
been the recurrence of financial crises. As Marois (2011) argues, the 
recoveries from the crisis in Mexico and Turkey have reinforced the leading 
role of finance and banking interests in the national political economy. Global 
factors also play a key role. Indeed some Marxist scholars have explicitly 
argued that the rise of financialisation in developing countries is the result of 
the international power of the US, principally through the rise of the US dollar 
as a quasi world currency (Painceira, 2009; Lapavitsas, 2009). This view is 
also taken up by Powell (2013), who considers this an important element 
shaping the subordinate character of financialisation in peripheral countries. 
These themes will be discussed in section 3.  
2. Financialisation	in	Developing	Countries:	Key	
Empirical	Facts	
 
Several authors have pointed to different empirical facts associated with 
financialisation. These can be grouped into changes affecting the main 
sectors of the economy, firms, households and banks, as well as some 
peculiar trends within developing countries, such as the expansion of foreign 
banks, microfinance, and the financialisation of commodity markets. 
A first key theme is the implication of financialisation for non-financial firms’ 
investment. A common observation is that firms increasingly engage in 
financial rather than productive investment. This a key research issue in the 
work of Firat Demir (Demir, 2007; Demir, 2009a; Demir, 2009b): using micro-
level data for Argentinean, Mexican and Turkish firms, he finds that policies of 
financial liberalisation do not significantly contribute to reduce capital market 
imperfections, while on the other hand the availability of financial investment 
as well as the differential return between financial and non-financial 
investment have a negative effect on productive investment and a positive 
effect on financial investment. The increasing importance of financial 
activities, including derivatives speculation, for non-financial corporations is 
testified by several different studies (Correa et al., 2012; Farhi and Borghi, 
2009; Rossi, 2011). Additionally, firms’ productive investment may be reduced 
as a result of the increasing attention to the creation of “shareholder value”. 
As a result of financial liberalisation in South Korea, “the pressure from foreign 
and domestic financial investors led to costly efforts by Korean corporations to 
increase shareholder value and to defend themselves against possible hostile 
takeovers, which impeded productive investment.” (Kalinowski and Cho 2009: 
28). Moreover there is evidence that shareholder orientation in South Korea 
has decreased not only productive investment but also investment in 
Research and Development, with potentially more damaging long-term effects 
(Seo et al., 2012). Karwowski (2012) presents evidence that South African 
firms are “over-capitalised”, that is they hold financial assets way in excess of 
what they need for their productive activities, so that firms have become the 
largest holders of bank deposits. 
At the macro-level the combined availability of high-return short-term 
financial investments and the pressure from financial investors have led in 
many developing countries to a reduction in productive investments, which 
have fallen as a share of GDP (Araújo et al., 2012; Demir, 2009b; Kalinowski 
and Cho, 2009; Shin, 2012; Tan, 2013). Furthermore, figures for Brazil 
suggest that the actual drop in manufacturing within the non-corporate sector 
is even higher, as manufacturing contribution to GDP dropped by 50% since 
1980, while lower-quality and natural-resource intensive activities have grown 
at the expense of labour-intensive production (Araújo et al., 2012). This 
clearly has negative impacts for employment and wages. In Mexico, for 
instance, real minimum wages have declined constantly since the 1980s so 
that half of the working force is now working in the informal sector (Correa et 
al., 2012). Furthermore it has reinforced income inequality, where richer 
families that can obtain financially related income have seen an increase in 
earnings in spite of the downward trend in wages. Similarly, in South Korea, 
since the late 1990s about half of the working force is employed with contracts 
lasting one year or less (Kalinowski and Cho, 2009). In this sense, as Araújo 
et al. (2012) argue, “financialization becomes an even bigger structural 
obstacle, since it causes functional re-concentration of incomes in favour of 
the holders of capital without necessarily inducing them to raise the level of 
productive investment, a basic factor in the generation of employment and 
income” (p. 23).  
Changes in the financial sector itself also constitute a central theme of the 
financialisation literature. A transition to more market-based financial systems 
is a theme for many countries that traditionally relied on more or less directed-
credit through the banking sector. While, as previously mentioned, in the case 
of Brazil financialisation is generally understood to have expanded by leading 
to the rise of high-interest rate “rents”, in Asian countries the expansion of 
capital markets may signal financialisation through asset prices (i.e. “fictitious 
capital” according to the terminology of Becker et al. (2010)). Lee (2012) finds 
that the expansion of financialisation in East-Asia can be seen in the rise of 
three patterns: the expansion of stock-markets, fuelled by regional integration 
and capital account liberalisation; the changing role of banks, which now 
engage in different kinds of activities, such as securitisation, trading and 
insurance; the rise of institutional investors, especially mutual funds and 
sovereign wealth funds. Rethel (2010) further specifies some of these 
patterns for the case of Malaysia. Policy efforts were aimed at developing 
local capital markets, especially bond markets, which poses a challenge in 
terms of credit allocation, since “the expansion of bond finance further 
entrenches a two-tiered industrial structure in Malaysia, which privileges 
bigger corporations, often linked to the government, to the disadvantage of 
SMEs” that do not have access to capital markets (Rethel 2010: 496). At the 
same time banks have reoriented their activities towards trading and fee-
generating business. Paradigmatic is the case of Cagmas, a state-led 
financial institution set up to facilitate the availability of affordable housing, 
which slowly turned into the biggest securitization provider in the country. 
Banks also reoriented their business by allocating an increasing proportion 
of credit to households. Examples of studies testifying this phenomenon are 
Ergunes (2009) for the Case of  Turkey,  Chang (2010) an Cho (2010) for 
South Korea, Rethel (2010) for Malaysia, dos Santos, (2011; 2013) and 
Painceira (2012) for Brazil, dos Santos, (2011; 2013) for Mexico, Turkey and 
Poland, Becker et al. (2010) for Slovakia, Ashman et al. (2011) and 
Karwowski (2012) for South Africa and Gabor (2010) for Eastern Europe. All 
these studies document that credit to household expanded quite dramatically 
over the past decade, often from very low or negligible levels.  
A very important development in the financial sector is the expansion of 
foreign banks into the domestic market. The policy push above reviewed was, 
in general successful, so that in many countries foreign banks have come to 
occupy an important place in the domestic financial sector. Several studies 
reveal that foreign banks have come to play a substantial and in some cases 
a leading role in Mexico (Correa et al., 2012), Turkey (Ergunes, 2009), 
Eastern Europe (Cetkovic, 2011), South Korea (Cho, 2010), Philippines 
Mexico and Brazil (Lapavitsas and dos Santos, 2008). In a couple of works 
considering the issue, dos Santos highlights evidence suggesting that foreign 
banks are often key agencies in transmitting “financialised” practices, i.e. they 
obtain high profits through non-credit activities, such as trading and fees and 
commissions, as well as through aggressive household lending. In Brazil and 
Mexico, for example, foreign banks have led the way in driving the expansion 
of credit card lending and mortgages, with other banks quickly adapting to the 
new tendencies (dos Santos, 2011; 2013). Analogous trends can be found in 
South Korea (Cho, 2010). In Eastern Europe foreign banks have taken the 
lead in the expansion of foreign currency household loans and the rise of 
speculative activities (dos Santos, 2011; Gabor, 2010). Additionally, foreign 
banks have been critical in channelling the effects of the global financial crisis 
into emerging markets. Foreign banks were at the core of the increasing 
borrowing from abroad in South Korea during the pre-crisis years, generating 
substantial external vulnerabilities that turned into serious financial distress 
during the crisis (Cho, 2010).  In Mexico, on the other hand, foreign banks 
responded to the crisis in the US by repatriating profits to cover losses, and 
further reducing credit availability, thus directly contributing to the 
transmission of the crisis (Correa et al., 2012). 
The changes of the financial sector had consequences for households’ 
income, a growing proportion of which is used to repay interest on loans. In 
Turkey, for example, household-debt to income increased from 7.5 % in 2002 
to 29.5% in 2007, while interest payments as a percentage of income 
increased from 2.1% to 4.6% in the same period (Ergunes, 2009). As a result, 
the cyclical expansions and contractions of household credit often created an 
additional layer of financial instability as well as an additional channel for crisis 
transmission. For example, in South Korea a credit card boom that eventually 
burst in 2003 resulted in widespread defaults of households and, in turn, 
financial institutions, which were bailed out by the State (Chang, 2010). In 
South Africa, a consequence of the American sub-crime crisis was a domestic 
credit crunch, that resulted in widespread defaults and the repossessions of 
both real estate and automobiles (Ashman et al., 2011). 
In some countries the expansion of household debt had a very important 
“functional” role, in the management of the business cycle, much like it had 
within Anglo-Saxon capitalism. In Slovakia, for example, the expansion of 
household debt over the past decade has sustained aggregate demand in a 
situation of low wages (Becker et al., 2010). Similarly, in Malaysia credit to 
households was a central element in the government efforts to promote a 
consumption-led recovery after the 1998 crisis (Rethel, 2010). Moreover, 
household lending becomes a key mechanism in social reproduction: “never 
has access to finance been so decisive for both social mobility and 
entrepreneurial success. Indeed, credit has become increasingly important to 
access basic public goods such as education and health care” (Rethel 2010: 
498). Unequal access to credit can thus exacerbate existing social and 
economic inequalities.  
In addition to the expansion of household lending, “mass-based 
financialisation” has also resulted in the increasing participation of (especially 
middle-class) households into the active managements of their financial and 
housing assets. This issue seems to be particularly relevant for East Asia, 
where the post-crisis reforms pushed those countries towards a more “Anglo-
Saxon” type of financial system. The documented expansion of institutional 
investors in East Asia is an aspect of this (Lee, 2012). Once again the 
metamorphosis of existing Malaysian institutions into channels of 
financialisation stands out as a paradigmatic case (Rethel, 2010). Investment 
trusts, which were originally implemented as a vehicle to spread diffused 
ownership within the local Malay population (bumiputeras) as part of the 
policies to promote the rise of a local entrepreneurial class, have become the 
primary institutional investors in the country, aside from state pension funds. 
The gradual opening to non-bumiputeras as well as the diversification into 
different asset types indicates the shift in intentions of these funds “from a 
concern with the (ethnical) redistribution of corporate ownership to a more 
general mandate to promote portfolio investment and to inculcate a (low risk) 
investment culture that draws more and more people into the market.” (Rethel 
2010: 502).  
Housing and real estate have risen in many countries, a fact that is often the 
counterpart of the increasing household debt. In South Africa, for example, 
property prices increased by 389% between 1997 and 2008 (Ashman et al., 
2011). In South Korea the extension of credit to households after the credit 
card bubble in 2003 was predominantly in the form of mortgages, sustained 
by a steady increase in house prices (Chang, 2010; Cho, 2010). The already 
mentioned Cagmas in Malaysia has been at the centre of the parallel 
expansion of homeownership and mortgages, as well as a securitisation 
provider, all of which is clearly reminiscent of the renowned US institutions 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Rethel, 2010).  
Social policy reforms are however not confined to countries that actively 
pursued (indebted) consumption-led strategies. The penetration of finance 
into an ampler range of social policy is in this sense a global trajectory that 
goes somewhat beyond pure economic policies. Privatisation of pensions and 
insurance, for instance, has occurred in Mexico (Correa et al., 2012). Perhaps 
the most famous case is that of Chile, which was a pioneer in privatising its 
retirement system through the creation of pension funds. Such schemes have 
provided a very direct way in which finance has penetrated the life of many 
Chileans. First of all, the very highly concentrated sector, both in terms of 
ownership – often by foreign financial institutions – and in terms of 
investment, has over its whole existence proved to be very costly for 
pensioners, with about one third of contributions kept by fund management 
and owners in fees and commissions (Sumaria, 2010). Moreover, the financial 
crisis has put a lot of stress on the funds, so that old-age income security is at 
risk, which has led to pension reforms by the Chilean government (Riesco, 
2009). 
Even amongst the poorer strata of society, financialisation makes its way 
through the expansion of microfinance. Microfinance itself has been 
increasingly “financialised” by linking in to the global capital markets. 
According to Aitken (2010), microfinance “has recently become a site of 
financialization, that is an object transformed into an ‘investable asset’ 
capable of generating financial profits for investors” (p. 230). This refers to the 
rise of microfinance investment funds (MIFs), through which it is possible to 
invest in institutions directly providing micro-credit, or, more commonly to 
purchase a securitised microloan-backed asset (Aitken, 2013). Such funds 
have attracted a rising amount of flows from investors, initially as “socially-
concerned investments”, but subsequently these turned into purely financially 
driven allocations (Tyson, 2011). In fact, such funds are seen as a way to 
diversify portfolios, since MIFs present low correlations with other assets 
(Aitken, 2010). In this context it is not surprising to see a shift in microfinance 
practices towards commercialisation, as Tyson (2012) documents: firstly, the 
growth of microfinance has been remarkable 3 ; secondly, microfinance 
institutions themselves have changed nature, as the sector is becoming 
dominated by regulated fully-fledged financial institutions as opposed to 
NGOs and credit-unions; thirdly, the activities of microfinance institutions have 
moved away from credit for investment in productive activities towards 
consumption lending and other financial services, and away from group 
lending to individual lending. These moves made microfinance extremely 
profitable, so that vast investments poured into MFIs. As a result, 
microfinance institutions actively turned themselves into financial institutions 
through IPOs such as the one of the renowned institution Compartamos in 
Mexico, which was vastly oversubscribed (Aitken, 2010; Aitken, 2013). Such 
processes, while making microfinance more self-sustainable, have made it 
highly unstable and destabilising. In India the high potential yield have 
essentially generated a bubble-like phenomenon of expansion and contraction 
as soon as the first defaults set in (Wichterich, 2012). Additionally, the 
aggressive credit extension have generated situations of over-indebtedness 
and serious financial distress, to the extent that it generated over 200 
thousands suicide among farmers (Wichterich, 2012). Even where situations 
are less tragic, it seems that microfinance, as a result of growing 
                                            
3 For example, the number of microfinance institutitions grew from 618 in 
1998 to 3,552 in 2008. 
financialisation, fails to alleviate poverty substantially.  
Finally, financialisation has affected developing countries indirectly, through 
its impact on commodities. Commodity prices have exhibited a typical boom-
bust trajectory over the 2002-2007 period (Akyüz, 2012). There is 
considerable evidence that such price instability was driven by financial 
investors, who rapidly included commodity futures and even “real” 
commodities as an asset class into their portfolio, attracted by their low return 
correlation with the standard financial assets (Wray, 2008; Tang and Xiong, 
2010; Ventimiglia, 2012). The impacts of such cycles affected developing 
countries considerably. Despite their positive effect on the current account of 
commodity exporters, they have generated some sort of “Dutch disease” 
phenomenon where production and investment in commodity sectors crowd 
out investment in other sectors (Araújo et al., 2012; Nissanke, 2010). 
Moreover, as Newman (2009) reports for the case of coffee, the increasing 
financialisation of commodities may reinforce the already existing inequalities 
in the production chain.  
In conclusion, the literature on financialisation and development is extremely 
vast and wide-ranging. The themes considered so far refer to the “domestic” 
aspects of financialisation of developing and emerging countries. However in 
many cases, the literature refers to the issues of capital account liberalisation 
and its consequences for capital flows and exchange rates as a key theme for 
financialisation. The aspects of “international financialisation” deserve further 
treatment and will be considered in the next two sections. 
3. Critical	Views	on	Financial	Globalisation	
 
Alongside the development of the consensus views on financial 
globalisation 4, the heterodox traditions of economics have also assessed 
capital flows and their impact on emerging and developing economies. This 
section will review such contributions by firstly looking at models of Minskyan 
boom-bust cycles in the context of emerging markets crisis. It will proceed to 
analyse the heterodox criticisms of the mainstream foreign capital-growth 
nexus, and present alternative views. Then it will analyse the implication of 
such alternative theories for global imbalances and the rise of foreign 
exchange reserves. Finally, it will look at the theory of currency hierarchies 
and its relation to capital flows. 
Much as in the mainstream, a first line of inquiry has sought to analyse 
emerging markets currency and financial crises, following the events in the 
late 1990s. The typical “boom and bust” dynamics of such crises, coupled with 
the progressive deterioration of balance sheets makes Hyman Minsky’s 
“financial instability hypothesis” (FIH) a particularly suitable framework of 
analysis. The literature applying the FIH in the context of emerging markets 
crises is extremely vast (Taylor, 1998; Kregel, 1998; Palma, 1998; Dymski, 
1999; De Paula and Alves, 2000; Arestis and Glickman, 2002; Schroeder, 
2002; Grabel, 2003; Cruz et al., 2006; Onaran, 2007; Frenkel and Rapetti, 
2009). All these papers present a similar story of the emerging countries 
crisis, where capital flows are an additional element of financial instability. 
                                            
4 See, for instance, Kose et al. (2006) for a wide-ranging review. 
Domestic financial liberalisation reforms, which usually precede the beginning 
of a boom phase, have the effect of rising interest rates and generally making 
domestic returns attractive for investors. Once the capital account is 
liberalised, the high interest spread induces both domestic and foreign players 
to finance themselves in foreign currency to invest in domestic currency 
assets. As capital flows grow, the liquidity in financial markets flourishes and 
asset prices increase, which in turn attract more capital flows in a positive-
feedback fashion. At the same time capital flows appreciate the real-exchange 
rate, which slowly deteriorate the country’s current account and external 
financial position. The boom also starts to make the balance sheets of many 
economic units in the country more and more fragile.  Awareness of the 
country’s deteriorating fundamentals and currency overvaluation spreads, and 
investors start to limit their exposures. This in turn slows the boom, which 
further deteriorates the financial structure of more economic units.  At some 
point, either a domestic economic event – such as the failure of a major 
financial institution – or policy shock – such as the sudden relinquishment of 
an exchange rate peg by the central bank – or the decision of foreign 
investors to speculate against the currency, spreads the panic: capital flows 
suddenly stop and turn negative. Financial fragility becomes a widespread 
financial crash as the currency depreciates, generating extremely serious 
issues for all borrowers in foreign currencies, and in turn for the whole 
economy.  
These views present a powerful narrative against the predominant “moral 
hazard” view of the crisis of emerging countries. As Palma (1998) claims, 
“over-lending” and “over-borrowing” may be reinforced by distortions in 
incentives and regulations, but they are essentially endogenous components 
of a free-market economy. The endogenous character of the crisis is 
presented as the key distinguishing element of Minskyan approaches to 
emerging markets crises vis-à-vis standard approaches. Arestis and Glickman 
(2002) vividly makes this point:  
“[…] whilst there may be some common ground, the differences are crucial. 
The most striking of these relates to the question of whether the source of the 
Asian crisis was endogenous or exogenous and the related issue of the 
coincidence or otherwise of financial liberalisation and financial crisis. A 
further crucial difference is that whilst [the conventional views] hold one group 
of actors or another, lenders borrowers or the authorities, our Minskyan thesis 
incorporates all of them into an endogenous interpretation of the crisis. We 
may conclude therefore that ours is a more general approach.” Arestis and 
Glickman (2002: 255) 
Capital account liberalisation is therefore criticised as a policy move that 
favours the rise of a boom-bust cycle in emerging countries. And conversely, 
capital account management is advocated as a way to avoid or limit the 
effects of the crises5. 
The heterodox criticism towards free capital movements was, however, not 
only confined within the issue of financial crises. The conventional 
understanding of the finance-growth nexus, upon which all the various strands 
of financial liberalisation policies are based upon, was criticised heavily by 
                                            
5 See Grabel (2003) for a comprehensive review and assesment of such 
policy proposals. 
Nissanke and Stein (2003). The authors consider these views, according to 
which the financial system is there to channel funds from units in deficits to 
units in surplus and any problems arising within it are due to various form of 
informational problems, as static and impoverished. They contrast them with a 
view, based on the works of Keynes, Minsky and Schumpeter, where finance 
is a central component of capitalist accumulation and endogenously creates 
the potential for instability, since uncertainty is pervasive and generates 
systemic risks, as opposed to idiosyncratic risks created by moral hazard. 
Therefore, instead of adopting a “plumbing” approach that simply aims to 
correct the distortions of an otherwise sound system, countries should seek to 
reform the “architecture” of their financial system. This entails a vast 
reorientation of institutions that together enable financial circuits to better 
intersect with circuits of production, in direct contrast to policies of financial 
and capital account liberalisation, which favoured short-term profits orientation 
and risk-taking in financial markets and discouraged productive investment.  
In this sense the traditional balance of payment distinctions between debt 
and direct investment flows becomes less important, as no type of capital 
flows necessarily ends up in the productive side of the economy. Indeed, 
some authors have argued that FDI, which even critics of financial 
globalisation, such as Stiglitz (2000) considered positively, can be as 
ineffective to spur growth and just as dangerous forms of external exposure 
as short-term capital flows (Singh, 2003).  
A systematic theoretical critique of the foreign capital-growth link was made 
by Bresser-Pereira, 2002 and Bresser-Pereira and Gala (2009) and in a very 
recent paper by Arestis and Resende (2013). Running a current account 
deficit does not bring an acceleration of accumulation, since in general it will 
appreciate the real exchange rate, increasing income and domestic 
consumption. In this sense foreign saving will simply replace the decline of 
domestic saving, and foreign debt is essentially financing consumption rather 
than investment. Only if investment opportunities make the marginal 
propensity to consume fall, will income from foreign capital flows be spent in 
investment, and thus contribute to a sustainable high-growth pattern. This 
condition is found to be rare though, such that the low growth of Brazil since 
the 1990s is attributed precisely to the policy shift in favour of a foreign-
savings growth strategy (Bresser-Pereira, 2002).  
This argument is very similar to the critique of financial globalisation by 
Rodrik and Subramanian (2009), on the basis of the investment-constraint vs 
saving-constraint argument. An important difference though is that Rodrik and 
Subramanian’s analysis is based on a loanable funds model: in the saving-
constrained economy, capital flows increase the supply of “investable 
resources”, thereby reducing the interest rate and spurring investment. 
Developing countries are investment-constrained not because of a 
fundamental demand-constraint on growth, but because there are some 
institutional weaknesses or because there are large learning externalities in 
investment. To the contrary, the primary purpose of Arestis and Resende 
(2013) is to show that the FISF (finance-investment-saving-finance) circuit, 
which relies on the traditional Keynesian proposition that investment drives 
saving is valid even in the open-economy. In open-economy with non zero-
elasticity of import and export to the exchange rate, when the exchange rate 
appreciates, exports decrease and imports increase. If domestic investment – 
i.e. the demand for capital goods - stays at the same level, there will be at 
least a partial part of capital goods imported that is not matched by exports. 
This gap, which mirrors the current account deficit, increases saving in the 
other country. Investment therefore determines saving even in the open 
economy but it may not necessarily generate domestic saving: it may 
generate saving abroad. The real exchange rate becomes in this sense a 
distributional variable between domestic and foreign saving. 
Indeed a criticism that applies to the conventional approaches to financial 
globalisation is their reliance on loanable funds theory. Real interest rates at 
the global level are assumed to be determined as the equilibrium between the 
global supply and demand for loanable funds (Perraton, 2012). In a very 
influential paper Borio and Disyatat (2011) criticise the conventional excess 
savings view of global imbalances. They argue that such view confuses 
saving, which is unspent income, with financing, a cash-flow concept 
indicating a flow of funds. In the open-economy context this is reflected by 
confusion between net and gross flows: net flows are simply the financial 
counterpart of trade and income factors, while gross flows are all flows of 
funds moving across borders. Current account data do not necessarily 
provide any indication of how investment is financed, nor is it conversely 
warranted to connect any specific gross flow to the current account.  
Bibow (2010) makes a very similar point in his criticism of global imbalances:  
“Simply put, in the context of monetary production economies the supposed 
excess saving (or: saving glut) can only arise together with the corresponding 
excess spending being done by someone else, somewhere.” (Bibow 2010: 6) 
Such excess spending arose in the US, which experienced a consumer-led 
boom, driven by the expansion of private credit, especially in the form of 
mortgages. These phenomena have been fuelled by financial innovation and 
encouraged by the expansionary monetary policy of the Federal Reserve. The 
resulting “global dollar glut” spilled over to other countries. Most of it, however, 
returned to the US in the form of reserves accumulation.  
In another article, Bibow (2008) considers the desirability of such 
arrangements from the point of view of developing countries. While 
undoubtedly this accumulation has costs and may be sometimes related to 
some form of mercantilist strategy, it raises more fundamental doubts about 
capital account openness. Notwithstanding the weak relations between 
foreign capital flows and growth, the current pattern of these flows, which are 
simply recycled into low yield US assets, is of little benefit for these countries. 
While this seems somewhat preferable to the risky building up of current 
account deficits that preceded the late 1990s crises, it is nonetheless a very 
distorted system, where developing countries essentially play the role of 
providers of high return assets for foreign rentiers. It is preferable in this sense 
to have a comprehensive system of capital account management. Even the 
supposed “collateral benefits” could be achieved by allowing only a selective 
range of long-term capital flows that match the needs of the country, and 
importing selective services that could improve the efficiency of the country.  
The accumulation of foreign exchange reserves is the focus of scholars 
working in the Marxist political economy tradition (Painceira, 2009; 
Lapavitsas, 2009). Developing countries in the era of financialisation have 
accumulated vast reserves, either to maintain their trade competitiveness or 
to shield themselves from financial crises. The role of the US dollar as a 
“quasi-world money”, that is the ultimate means of payment to settle 
international transactions, makes the purchase of safe US public debt 
securities the easiest way to accumulate reserves. The rise of the US dollar 
has also been fostered by the changes in the “world market”, i.e. the rapid 
expansion of internationalised circuits of production and trade. The need of 
multinational corporations to engage in international financial transactions 
have boosted international capital and money market and reinforced the role 
of the US dollars as (Powell, 2013). 
These analyses underline the exploitative character of such international 
arrangements:  
“Issuing quasi-world-money has become an international mechanism for the 
rich to extract value from the poor in the context of financialisation and free 
capital flows. In this sense, reserve accumulation is an exploitative process, a 
form of tribute accruing passively to the issuer of quasi-world money.” 
(Painceira, 2009: 21). 
Reserve accumulation is also seen as a key channel of transmission 
between international finance and domestic financialisation. The central banks 
operations pertaining to reserve accumulation and subsequent sterilisation 
have created a pool of domestic liquidity for domestic banks, which enabled 
the expansion of their balance sheets (Painceira, 2010; Painceira, 2012). 
Gabor (2010) analyses the situation of Eastern European countries, and 
highlights the role of central banks sterilisation bonds in creating the pool of 
liquidity that banks used to engage in a range of risky (such as foreign 
currency lending to households) or effectively speculative activities (including 
carry trade and currency arbitrage). This situation made the central banks 
actions to address the post-2008 crisis more difficult, since liquidity provision 
could have the conflicting effects of providing relief to the financial system and 
creating incentives for currency speculations in an already unstable 
environment.  
Furthermore, the new configuration of financial globalisation, with more 
sound “fundamentals” and reserve accumulation by emerging markets, does 
not seem to have reduced the cyclicality of capital flows. As Akyüz (2012) 
shows, since 2002 the positive relation between capital flows, asset prices 
and exchange rates in emerging markets has kept intact, with an even closer 
co-movement across different countries. Equity markets boomed and real 
exchange rates vis-à-vis the dollar appreciated considerably between 2000 
and 2008 and crashed together in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers 
collapse, only to recover in a new boom since 2009. The much more solid 
structure of these economies, such as the current account surpluses or small 
deficits, “sound” fiscal situations, the much smaller incidence of currency 
mismatches and substantial levels of foreign exchange reserves, has avoided 
the catastrophic consequences of previous crises, but could not prevent the 
sudden stop in capital flows, asset price deflation and sharp currency 
devaluation.  
Brazil’s situation during the crisis is emblematic. As Kaltenbrunner (2010) 
and Painceira and Kaltenbrunner (2009) show, despite solid fundamentals the 
country experienced one of the world’s largest currency depreciation. The 
rapid integration of the country has made the Brazilian Real one of the most 
traded emerging currencies, turning it into a financial asset itself. The external 
vulnerabilities, given by a large stock of liabilities to foreign investors, were 
critical in determining the seriousness of the crisis. In this sense capital flows 
themselves, regardless of their precise form, create a vulnerability to foreign-
driven shocks.  
The underlying reasons for this can be found in the theory of currency 
hierarchies (Terzi, 2005; Kaltenbrunner, 2011; Andrade and Prates, 2013). 
Accordingly, exchange rates can be understood on the basis of Keynes’ 
theory of the own rate of interest: internationally each currency has a different 
liquidity premium, based on its role in the international financial system. This 
points to a hierarchy between currencies that have a higher liquidity premium, 
with currencies that have lower liquidity premia having to compensate with 
higher returns. A currency’s position in the hierarchy depends on the ability to 
use it as a store of value. Kaltenbrunner (2011) adds to this view, by arguing 
that a currency’s liquidity premium depends on its capacity to be used to face 
liabilities. This depends on mainly two factors: the first is the external stock of 
liabilities, the second is the ability of the country issuing the currency to meet 
the commitments through its favourable foreign exchange position and the 
“institutional” liquidity of its financial markets. In such a situation, capital flows 
to emerging markets are doomed to be characterised by boom-bust cycles, 
since investment in a country’s assets will by definition occur in a phase of 
lower liquidity preference and higher return seeking (Biancareli, 2009; 
Biancareli, 2011). Once again, the policy implication of such an analysis 
would point towards the possibility of capital controls that may reduce the 
exposure of emerging countries and thus allow them to reduce the negative 
effects that their lower position in the hierarchy in which they are relegated by 
the asymmetries of the global financial system. These theories are in clear 
contrast with mainstream theories of financial globalisation. While both 
theories point to the weaker position of developing countries in the global 
financial system, a deeper and more liquid financial system as a result of 
foreign capital is a source of potential instability, as opposed to a potential 
way to overcome the “original sin”. Unsurprisingly the new IMF stance 
towards capital controls is seen by many as “too moderate” and insufficient to 
face the problems of modern financial globalisation (Fritz and Prates, 2013; 
Akyüz, 2012; Gallagher and Ocampo, 2013). 
 
4. Conclusion	
 
This paper has attempted to give a comprehensive review of the growing 
literature on financialisation and other critical approaches to finance, in the 
context of emerging and developing economies. Differently from mainstream 
scholars, these authors have pointed out some critical developments arising 
from the rise of finance and their potentially harmful impacts on the 
development prospects of those countries. 
While the literature is still relatively recent and is still expanding, much can be 
learned from these approaches and hopefully contribute positively to the 
policy debates to ensure that finance best serves the needs of development 
rather than the other way around. 
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